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“Although presumption is not evidence and has no weight as such, it does 
make a prima facie case for the party in whose favor it exists and points out 
the party who has the burden of going forward [...], but it must be 
remembered at all times that basic facts must be supplied before a 
presumption comes into existence, [. ], and it has a binding effect until 
successfully rebutted by the other party.”1
Abstract
‘Presumption’ is an ambiguous term that one often finds in substantive and 
procedural laws. The controversy regarding the operation and effect of 
‘presumption’ in civil proceedings has not yet been conclusively resolved 
despite efforts of scholars. In Ethiopia, it has been subject to different judicial 
interpretations. The Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court has 
adopted a binding interpretation of Art 2024 of the Civil Code on the 
presumption of payment of debts. Yet, the propriety of this authoritative 
interpretation has become contentious. This Article examines the operations 
and effects of presumptions in civil actions in general and inquires into the 
propriety of the precedent adopted by the Cassation Division. It argues that the 
Division’s interpretation needs to be reconsidered when the issue arises in 
future cases.
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Introduction
Since the re-amendment of the Federal Courts Proclamation2 (which
reintroduced the doctrine of precedent in Ethiopia3), the Cassation Division of 
the Federal Supreme Court has exercised its (statutory and constitutional) 
cassation and precedential powers.4 it has reviewed cases it considered to have 
had fundamental errors of law5 and rendered binding precedents. As per Art 2 
(1) of the Proclamation, an “interpretation of a law by the Federal Supreme 
Court rendered by the Cassation Division with not less than five judges shall be 
binding on federal as well as regional (courts) at all levels.” (Emphasis added). 
It is, however, important to note that it is the interpretation of a given law (by
2 Federal Courts Proclamation No.25/1996, Fed. Neg Gaz. 2nd Year, No.13.
3 Since 1962 there had been, at least on paper, the principle of stare decisis (or doctrine 
of precedent) with regard to interpretation in the Ethiopian legal system. According to 
Art 15 of the Courts Proclamation of 1962, (Proclamation No. 195/1962, Neg. Gaz, 
22nd year, No.7) decisions of superior courts on matters of law were binding on 
subordinate courts. This Proclamation was however repealed thirteen years later by 
the Administration of Justice Proclamation No. 52/1975, Neg. Gaz. 35th Year No. 2. 
Ethiopia once again re-introduced the doctrine of precedent into her legal system in 
2005 by the Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation No. 454/ 2005, 
hereinafter, the Proclamation. This Proclamation entered into force as of 14 June, 
2005/ Sene 7, 1997 E.C.
4 By virtue of Art 80-(3) (a) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, hereafter the Constitution, and Art 10(1), (2), and (3) of the Federal Courts 
Proclamation, the Federal Supreme Court is empowered to review final court 
decisions in cassation. It is clear that this court has statutory and constitutional power 
of cassation today. Such practice of reviewing in cassation is believed to have been 
introduced into Ethiopia for the first time during the era of Emperor Menilik II in 
1908. (See Yohannes Heroui (2009), ‘Brief Notes about Cassation Power and its 
Procedure’, (in Amharic), Ethiopian Bar Rev. Vol 3, No. 1, at 132. Since 1987, 
Ethiopia adopted clear legal frameworks regarding cassation power of the last resort 
court in the country. During the Dergue era, Arts 4 & 5 of the Supreme Court 
Establishment Proclamation No. 9/1987 expressly gave cassation power to the 
Supreme Court. Following the overthrow of the Dergue by the EPRDF (Ethiopian 
Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front) in 1991, this was replaced by Art 12 of the 
Central Government Courts Establishment Proclamation No. 40/1993 (Neg. Gaz. 52nd 
Year.No.25) of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. This was again followed by 
the above cited provisions of the FDRE Constitution and the Federal Courts 
Proclamation. At this juncture, it is essential to bear in mind the inherent differences 
that exist between cassation power and precedential power of a court.
5 See the decisions of the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court of Ethiopia, 
published in various volumes. According to the above-mentioned articles of the 
Constitution and the Federal Courts Proclamation only cases that allegedly contain
fundamental or basic errors of law can be reviewed in cassation.
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the Cassation Division in the presence of five or more judges) that is binding, 
and not the case decision as such. Case precedent, per se, enables courts to 
derive case law from the principles enshrined in the case analysis and decision, 
while binding interpretation is half-way between a purely statutory regime and a 
case law system because it does not require lower courts to use case law, as 
such. it rather obliges them to be bound by the cassation interpretation given to 
a law (i.e. statutory provision) in a certain fact situation so that the interpretation 
can be binding when similar issues and comparable fact situations are involved.
By exercising its judicial powers, the Supreme Court Cassation Division is 
playing a decisive role in ensuring the consistent application of national laws 
across the country and enhancing predictability of outcomes in court litigation. 
However, some of the interpretations that the court rendered in a few of the 
cases have, arguably, triggered controversy.6 A binding precedent of the 
Cassation Division which has provoked such a controversy is the legal 
interpretation it adopted in the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses 
v Mr. Bironi Atikpo case.7 The case involved various issues that pertain to 
presumptions, particularly presumptions of law, and burdens of pleading and 
proof. issues such as nature of presumptions, operation and effect of 
presumptions, relationship of burdens of proof and presumptions of law etc, 
were at the forefront of the judicial analysis and exposition.
There was no unanimity of opinion regarding the nature of presumptions of 
law and how they come into operation. They were divided on whether Art 2024 
of the Civil Code (1960) applies to a case where a defendant appears in court 
but does not deny plaintiff s allegation of non-payment of a debt that is more 
than two years overdue or in the case of an ex-parte proceeding. They disagreed 
on whether it is necessary to follow special rules of procedure and evidence if 
litigation involves a presumption of law such as the one embodied under Art 
2024 of the Civil Code. The binding precedent in the case was rendered by a 
close majority of 3 judges to 2 judges.
The majority’s exposition of presumptions of law, operation and effect of 
such presumptions, the alleged roles and responsibilities of litigating parties and 
courts in such a case, their subsequent interpretation of Art 2024 of the Civil 
Code as well as the contrary exposition by the minority, etc., evoke a couple of
6 See for example Mekbib Tsegaw (2007), ‘Contracts relating to an immovable and 
Questions of Form’, (in Amharic), Ethiopian Bar Rev. Vol.2. No. 1; Yohannes 
Heroui (2008), ‘Registration of Immovables under the Ethiopian Civil Code: An 
overview in Comparative perspective’, Ethiopian Bar Rev. Vol. 2 No. 2; Mehari 
Redae (2008), ‘Case Comment; Dissolution of Marriage by Disuse: A Legal Myth’, 
J. Eth. L. Vol. 22, No. 2.
7 File No 17068, Supreme Court Cassation Division decided on 19/11/1997 E.C.
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questions. A careful reading of the majority and the minority opinions of the 
court evokes the following questions: ‘What are presumptions?’ ‘Are they items 
of evidence?’ How does a given presumption of law come into operation in a 
given proceeding? How is such operation related to burdens of pleading and 
proof? What legal consequence(s) follow from an operation of a given 
presumption of law? Does the operation of any presumption of law in a given 
case require courts to follow special rules of evidence and procedure to resolve a 
dispute in litigation? These and related issues, of course, were the core themes 
in the case mentioned above.
Other subsequent cases bearing similar allegations of non-payment of 
matured debts falling under Art 2024 of the Civil Code have triggered the same 
issues. These cases were resolved in accordance with the majority’s 
interpretation of Art 2024 of the Civil Code in the Agency for the Administration 
of Rented Houses v. Bironi Atikpo case.8 A minor deviation was shown only last 
year in Commericial Bank of Ethiopia v Liyew Chekol & Million Mengistu 
wherein seven sitting judges unanimously observed that the type of presumption 
under Art 2024 of the Civil Code is a restrictively rebuttable presumption.9
The judicial interpretation in the cases mentioned above and other cases 
(both in lower and appellate courts) and the academic debate that ensued 
demonstrate the difficulties in establishing a proper link between presumptions 
of law and burdens of proof, on the one hand, and burdens of pleading, burdens 
of proof and presumptions of law, on the other. It is also clear that there is 
ambiguity in grasping the true nature of presumptions, in identifying the mode 
of operations and legal effects of the various presumptions. The Cassation cases 
mentioned above substantiate this fact.
in view of such divergence of opinion among judges and lawyers relating to 
presumptions in general and presumptions of law in particular, and also in view 
of such uncertainties about their operation and effects, an in-depth research on 
this area of the law is essential. The frequent appearance of civil cases that 
involve issues of presumption necessitate an extensive research. This Article is 
an attempt in that direction. Yet, its scope and depth are limited. It aims at 
giving a general overview of the concept, and canvassing the various types of 
presumptions along with their operations and legal effects. The Article assesses
8 See for instance the following cases: Dr. Daniel Alemu V W/ro Romanework 
Yemanebirhan et al (File No.14047), Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses 
V Sossina Asfaw (File No. 15992), Paoulos Rumicho V Chaltu Merdassa (File 
No.15493), and Riesom G/Medihin V Almaz G/Michael (27697). These indicate the 
recurrence of cases bearing similar issues in our courts.
9 Refer to Cassation File No 29181; this was rendered on 20 Tahisas 2002 E.C. 
Incidentally one learns the recurrence of cases bearing similar issues in our courts.
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the propriety of the binding precedent adopted by the majority in the Bironi 
Atikpo case, which represents the current binding interpretation. The Article 
focuses on civil proceedings although criminal proceedings are marginally 
touched upon in a few instances with a view to enhancing the clarity of ideas.
The first section of the article briefly highlights concepts and definitions. 
Sections 2 and 3 deal with types, operations and legal effects of various 
categories of presumptions. Section 4 briefly raises the issue of interrelationship 
between burdens of pleading, burdens of proof and rebuttable presumptions of 
law. Section 5 focuses mainly on the binding precedent adopted in the Agency 
for the Administration of Rented Houses v Bironi Atikpo case. This section and 
the sixth section probe whether the Court’s interpretation of Art 2024 of the 
Civil Code is valid. Particular attention is given to examining the propriety of 
the Cassation Court’s holdings relating to operation and effect of presumptions 
of law. Sections 5 and 6 also inquire whether the operation of any rebuttable 
presumption of law in a given civil proceeding really requires following of 
special procedural and evidentiary rules as the majority in the Cassation 
Division maintained. Finally, the author suggests that the Cassation Division of 
the Federal Supreme Court needs to revisit its legal interpretation of Art 2024 of 
the Civil Code in a future case that involves a similar issue as envisioned under 
Art 2(1) of Proclamation No. 454/2005.10
1. Concept and Definitions: An Overview
The term presumption is one of the most ambiguous and slippery terms in the 
whole corpus of the law.11 Yet, it is one of the most commonly employed terms 
in the legal literature, in law making and court decisions. Writing half a century 
ago, Laughlin noted that the Corpus Juris Secundum listed about 113 so-called 
presumptions.12 Writers on law of evidence, commentators, judges and law
10 See that Art 2 (1) provides: “...The cassation division may however give a different 
legal interpretation some other time.”
11 Fisk, Otis H. (1921), Presumptions in the Law, A suggestion, Reprinted in 
1997,William S. Hein &Co. Inc. Buffalo, New York, at 1-2; Andrews, John A. & 
Hirst, M. (1992), Criminal Evidence, 2nd ed., at 99; Elliott, D.W(2001), Phipson & 
Elliott Manual of the Law of Evidence, 2nd ed.(New Delhi: Sweet & Maxwell 
Limited), at 75-77; Emson, Raymond (2004), Evidence, 2nd ed.(New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan), at 457; Strong, John William (1992), McCormick on Evidence, 4th ed., at 
578; Morgan, Edmund M. (1938-1939), ‘Techniques in the use of Presumptions’, 24 
Iowa L. Rev., at 414, hereinafter to be cited as Morgan, Techniques. See also Fenner, 
G. M. (1991-1992), ‘Presumptions: 350 Years of Confusion and it has come to this’, 
25 Creighton L. Rev. at 383ff;
12 Laughlin, Charles V. (1953-1954), ‘In Support of the Thayer Theory of 
Presumptions’, 52 Mich. L. Rev. at 195. The same author observes that the term has
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makers both in the continental and common law countries have been using this 
term in varied senses and contexts.13 That loose employment of the term to 
signify different things has brought about uncertainties which transcend 
jurisdictions and times. inaccurate use of the term has resulted, says Belton, in 
confusing and incongruous attempts to apply a presumption analysis in 
inappropriate situations. since early times, especially from the twelfth until the 
nineteenth century many legal scholars made attempts to bring clarity to the 
various ideas of presumptions. it was in the course of such academic pursuits 
that Morgan, albeit figuratively, remarked, “Every writer of sufficient 
intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject-matter has approached 
the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness, and has left it with a 
feeling of despair.”14
Notwithstanding the complexities of the issues involved and variety of 
senses, legal scholars and commentators from the civil law tradition such as 
Tancredus, Alciati, Cujas, Domat, and Pothier, and from common law traditions 
such as Best, Gilbert, Greenleaf, Phillips, Starkie, Thayer, Wigmore, Morgan, 
McCormick, McBaine and others have examined the nature, operations and 
effects of presumptions.15 These efforts have brought about appreciable 
achievements and some degree of clarity of the concept. Thayer and Wigmore in 
particular are credited for their contribution towards semantic and conceptual 
clarity by narrowing down the senses in which the term ‘presumption’ has to be 
employed.
in spite of positive achievements toward the reduction of the degree of 
ambiguity, the term has still continued to connote different ideas. in an article 
written at the beginning of 1980s Allen expressed that the longstanding 
controversy over the nature and proper rule of presumptions in civil actions has 
continued undiminished in America16 and, for that matter in other jurisdictions 
as well, as it is the case in Ethiopia today. Emson has recently opined: 
“confusingly, the word ‘presumption’ is used in the law of evidence to describe
been so promiscuously used as to be devoid of much of its utility and that it has 
become a magic word. (Id.)
13 Id; Read also Shain, M. (1944), ‘Presumptions under the Common and the Civil 
Law’, 18 S. Cal. L. Rev., at 92 ff; and, McBaine, J.P (1937-1938), ‘Presumptions: 
Are they evidence?’ 26 Cal. L. Rev., at 522 ff.
14 Morgan, E. M. (1937) ‘Presumptions’, 12 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B. J, at 255, 
hereinafter, to be cited as Morgan, Presumptions.
15 For a brief historical reference read the two articles written by Shain and McBaine, 
note 13.
16 Allen, Ronald J. (1980-1981), ‘Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered’, 66 Iowa 
L. Rev. at 843.
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a number of different concepts which have little in common.”17 And as many 
authors including Hecht and Pinzler observed, there is great disagreement 
among legal writers, court judges, lawyers, academics and legal commentators 
as to the scope of the term and its operation in court trials.18
The term presumption is an English translation of the Latin term 
“praesumptio”. It originated from the Roman law of the Middle Ages.19 As Fisk 
noted, in the earlier days of Roman law, there have been praesumptio juris and 
praesumptio hominis. Shain adds praesumptiones juris et de jure. Fisk observed 
that “Praesumptio juris means a presumption (inference) of fact made by law: 
praesumptio hominis means a presumption (inference) of fact made by man.”20 
This does not tell us what the term presumption is. So, what is a presumption? 
is it a type of evidence? is it a substitute for evidence? Or is it a rule of law, or 
an argument, or a fact? Or is it all of these things? As the literature shows, 
particularly since the publication of Thayer’s book entitled A Preliminary 
Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law in 1898, many authors have raised 
these questions and tried to provide answers.
The 7th edition of Black’s Law Dictionary considers presumption as a “legal 
inference or assumption that a fact exists based on the known or proven 
existence of some other fact or group of facts” and it states that “[m]ost 
presumptions are rules of evidence calling for a certain result in a given case 
unless the adversely affected party overcomes it with other evidence. A 
presumption shifts the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, 
who can then attempt to overcome the presumption.” (Emphasis added). In other 
words, presumptions signify legal inferences or assumptions that trigger the 
drawing of conclusions from proved facts.
According to Fisk, presumption can be defined as : “A process of reasoning 
by which something not already deemed proved by pleadings or by admissions 
in court outside the pleadings or by judicial notice is deemed proved.”21 Thayer
17 Emson, note 11, at 457.
18 Hecht, Neil S. and Pinzler, William M (1978), ‘Rebutting Presumptions: Order out of 
Chaos’, 58 B. U. L. Rev., at 527-528.
19 Shian, note 13, at 92.
20 Fisk, note 11, at 4. This same author further said that the two Latin expressions could 
have properly been translated into English as “presumption by law” and 
“presumption by man”, respectively, but incorrectly translated as ’’presumption of 
law” and “presumption of fact”.
21 Id, at 9. The process, whether required and made by law or by judges, Fisk 
maintained, is an inference by legal reasoning or human reasoning (logic); it is a 
process of proving something by inference from something else proved or deemed 
proved.
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observes that “[presumptions are aids to reasoning and argumentation, which 
assume the truth of certain matters for the purpose of some given inquiry.”22 
Laughlin enumerated some eight diverse senses23 and preferred to take the 
eighth sense as useful to his context. Thus he took presumption as meaning a 
rule of law that shifts burden of proof. These definitions substantiate the view 
that most presumptions are rules of evidence, and not evidence, per se.
Klotter regards presumption as “a rule of law that attaches definite probative 
value to specific facts or draws a particular inference as to the evidence of one 
fact, not actually known, arising from its usual connection with other particular 
facts that are known or proved” and he considers it as “a legal principle 
whereby the court accepts the existence of one fact from other facts already 
proven.”24 Belton has a related idea. 25 On the other hand Ashford and Risinger 
define presumption as a “legal device which imposes the burden of introducing 
evidence as to a given issue upon the opponent of the party who has the burden 
of persuasion as to that issue.”26
Morgan states that “[p]resumptions may properly be used to designate the 
assumption of the existence of one fact, which the law requires the trier of fact to 
make on account of the existence of another fact or group of facts, standing
22 See McBaine, note 13, at 525.
23 Laughlin, note 12 at 196-209. These are: 1) As indicating a general disposition of 
courts; 2) As an authoritative reasoning principle; 3) As a rule of substantive law; 4) 
As a rule fixing the burden of persuasion; 5), As a permissible inference; 6) As a 
statutory prima facie case; 7) As a proposition of judicial notice, and 8) As a rule 
shifting the burden of producing evidence.
Laughlin mentions that professors Morgan and Maguire enumerated four senses in 
which this term is used. These are: (1) As synonymous with permissible inference, 
(2) as establishing a case sufficient to permit the judge to decide that the presumed 
fact exists (3) as requiring the acceptance of the presumed fact until certain specified 
conditions are met, and (4) as a conclusive presumption or rule of substantive law. 
(Id- therein at footnote 1.)
24 Klotter, John C. (2000), Criminal Evidence, 7th ed., at 106. Klotter has presented 
another definition which considers presumption as “an inference that common sense, 
enlightened by human knowledge and experience, draws from the connection, 
relation, and coincidence of facts and circumstances with each other.”Id.
25 Belton, Robert (1981), 'Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: 
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,’ 34 Vand. L. Rev., at 1222. He holds that 
presumption is “a rule of law that deals with the assumption-at least temporarily- of a 
certain factual situation based upon proof of other usually logically related facts.”
26 Ashford, Harold A. & Risinger, D. Michael (1969), 'Presumptions, Assumptions and 
Due process in Criminal cases: A theoretical overview’, 79 Yale L. J. No.2, at 172.
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alone.”27 Elliott regards presumptions “as a conclusion, which may or must be 
drawn in the absence of contrary evidence”28 while Andrews and Hirst, in a
relatively recent edition, note that ‘presumption’ “properly describes the process 
whereby, on the proof of one fact (the basic fact) another fact (the presumed 
fact) may be inferred. ”29 Having observed that the term is used loosely in the 
law of evidence, Dennis has reached a similar conclusion. 30 Hecht and Pinzler 
share the same view with Maguire regarding the standard definition of 
‘presumption’ which is said to exist when a designated basic fact or aggregate of 
facts exists. This envisages the existence of another fact or aggregate of facts, 
called the presumed fact or fact(s) that must be assumed in the absence of
adequate rebuttal.
Presumption may thus mean an inference, or an assumption of fact, or a
conclusion drawn from another fact, or a rule of law that fixes burden of 
persuasion, or a rule of law that shifts burden of production of evidence, etc. As 
a result, there is no agreement among legal scholars as to the correct and single 
definition of the term. 31 For most scholars and commentators, true presumptions 
mean more than mere inferences. It will thus be inappropriate to employ the 
term to mean a rule of law that fixes persuasive burden or to use it as a
substantive rule of law that results from proof of a given fact.32
in spite of such variations on the meaning of the term, most legal scholars 
today generally agree on one aspect of the term. In the words of Ashford and 
Risinger most agree “that a presumption is a legal mechanism which... deems 
one fact to be true when the truth of another fact has been established.” In the 
strict and proper sense, therefore, the term presumption is used to refer to the 
process whereby one fact must be inferred from the proof of another basic fact.
The fact which must be deemed proved is identified as the fact presumed while 
the other fact whose truth must be established before the fact presumed will be 
deemed true is referred to as the preliminary or basic fact.33 Hecht and Pinzler 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
27 Morgan, Edmund M. (1930-1931), ‘Some Observations Concerning Presumptions’, 
44 Harv. L. Rev, at 906; hereinafter to be cited as Morgan, Observations.
28 Elliott, note 11, at 75.
29 Andrews & Hirst, note 11, at 99.
30 Dennis, I.H. (2002), The Law of Evidence, 2nd ed., (London: Sweet & Maxwell 
Limited), at 401& 419. He notes that presumption “.. properly refers to an inference 
of fact, the ‘presumed’ fact that may or must be drawn from proof of another fact, 
often called the ‘basic’ fact.”
31 Ashford. & Risinger, note 26, at 165. They hold that “[t]here is no agreement among 
legal writers as to exactly what a presumption is..”
32 Andrews & Hirst, note 11, at 99; Belton, note 26, at 1222; McBaine, note 13, at 526­
530.
33Ashford and Risinger, note 31, at 165; See also Dennis, note 30, at 419.
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state that “[t]he fact that may be deemed proved by the operation of a 
presumption is called the "presumed fact" and the fact whose truth must be 
established before the presumed fact will be deemed true is called the "basic 
fact."34
As can be understood from the discussion above, a presumption is neither a 
fact nor evidence. We know that fact, unlike presumption, refers to an 
occurrence or event or state of affair which is perceptible through our sense 
organs. We also know that in the strict legal parlance evidence refers to that 
thing or circumstance or data that establishes or proves the existence or 
otherwise, the falsity or truthfulness of a fact under inquiry. it refers to one of 
the means of proof. It consists of oral, documentary and real evidence. But 
presumption is a different thing. it is not a kind of oral or documentary or real 
evidence. it may, however, be treated as one other mechanism of proving of 
facts under inquiry like evidence, formal admissions, or judicial notice - without 
being confused with any of the latter. To this end, McBaine stresses that it is 
wrong to treat presumptions as evidence or as something that is equivalent to 
evidence.
Moreover, presumption is neither argument nor an item of evidence.35 
Argument refers to the persuasive propositions of material facts, issues, laws, 
analysis, reasoning, conclusion and relief submitted by litigating parties while 
presumption is not. An item of evidence pertains to probative material which 
consists of oral testimony of witnesses or contents of documents (including 
electronic and digital data,) or appearance or state of conditions of physical 
objects while presumption is entirely a different thing. Belton and many others 
conclude that presumption is not even a substitute for evidence; it is a rule of 
law or a legal mechanism that operates to affect the evidential and persuasive 
burdens of litigating parties one way or the other. Belton writes: “[t]he weight 
of authority holds that genuine presumptions are neither evidence nor substitutes 34 35 34 35
34 Hetcht & Pinzler, note 18, at 529.
35 See Morgan, Observations, note 27, at 908; McBaine, note 13, at 526-530. Klotter 
writes, “Some courts [in the USA] argue that a true legal presumption is in the nature 
of evidence and is to be weighed as such. Others hold (probably more properly) that a 
presumption is not evidence, but is a substitute for evidence.”See Klotter, note 24, at 
106. McBaine wrote: “Though a presumption accomplishes the purpose of evidence 
...it does not follow that it is evidence.” In other pages he concludes that legal 
rebuttable presumptions (the true presumptions) are not evidence. They are rather 
rules of law in which, under certain circumstances, facts are deemed to be established 
until the contrary is proved. Note that McBaine made it clear that so-called 
presumptions of fact and irrebuttable presumptions of law are not true presumptions. 
The first are inferences drawn from evidence while the second are misnomers as they 
are substantive rules of law.
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for evidence, but are merely procedural devices that shift the burden of 
producing evidence to the party against whom it operates.”36 He maintains that 
they are burden-shifters.
As most scholars including Morgan, Laughlin, McBaine, and Belton (cited 
above) correctly stated, the true presumptions are rebuttable presumptions of 
law. And rebuttable presumptions of law are neither evidence nor substitutes for 
evidence. Rather, they are rules of law that require judges to draw conclusions 
about the truthfulness or falsity or the existence or otherwise of facts based upon 
other proven facts unless the adversely affected parties disprove the conclusions 
with evidence of any admissible kind.
Nevertheless, problems in drafting coupled with the semantic ambiguity in 
the usage of the term ‘presumption’ have brought about problems in various 
legislative formulations in Ethiopia.37A cursory look at of some of the Ethiopian 
laws proves that the term presumption is used to refer to a number of things in 
different contexts.38 It is thus necessary to identify the particular context in 
which this term is used in our laws.
in particular, one should not confuse the context in which the term is used in 
provisions which do not envisage a prior establishment of a given fact such as 
the constitutional presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings (until 
proven guilty) or the presumption of capability in civil proceedings (unless 
found otherwise). Under these contexts, the term is used without a precondition. 
Most presumptions that we find in our laws, however, presuppose the proving of 
some basic facts. Even then, there are basic distinctions that Ethiopian legal 
professionals need to explore, a theme which will be briefly addressed in the 
following section.
36 Belton, note 25, at 1222.
37 For a better understanding one may read McBaine’s article cited at note 13. One may 
find that presumption was listed as one type of evidence in the 1967 Draft Evidence 
Rule of Ethiopia. But it should be underlined that evidence is a means or device that 
helps establish a disputed matter of fact. And we have three types of evidence, viz., 
testimony, documentary evidence and real evidence. Presumption does not fit into 
any of these kinds of evidence. It is an idea that stands for something(s) or rule(s) 
different from any of these as shown so far. Discussion that pertains to Art 2002 of 
the Civil Code of Ethiopia is made under Section 6 below. Suffice here to mention 
McBaine’s conclusion that it is an “absurd and mischievous fallacy” to say that true 
presumptions, i.e., rebuttable presumptions are “evidence”.
38 One may check this fact by making a swift reading into any of the country’s codes or 
other laws. E.g. Art 20(4) Constitution; Arts 3, 4, 22, 196, 341, 342, 344, 346, 1162, 
1193, 1195, 1196,1200, 1201, 1259 of the Civil Code; Arts 63, 71, 97, 106, 126-129, 
148, 157, 169-172 of the Federal Revised Family Code of Ethiopia.
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2. Types, Operation and Effect: Presumptions Without and 
With Basic Facts
In the looser or broader sense, presumptions can be classified into two broad 
categories: Presumptions without basic facts and presumptions with basic facts. 
There is also another broad classification: presumption of fact and presumption 
of law.
2.1. Presumptions without Basic Facts
Presumptions without basic facts are said to be presumptions that arise without 
proof of any particular fact.39 In such cases we do not have preliminary (basic) 
facts and presumed facts to be drawn or inferred from basic facts. The law 
simply says that something shall be presumed until the contrary is proved. No 
precondition is set for the operation of such so-called presumptions. Truly 
speaking, such presumptions without basic facts are rules of substantive law that 
allocate or fix the place of burden of proving or legal burden of proof.40 It is 
regrettable that such rules are described in terms of presumptions.
Presumptions without basic facts do not need any prior fact to activate a 
particular presumption to come into operation. In Elliott’s words “no basic fact 
is needed to activate the presumption which applies in every case.”41 They arise, 
Emson maintains, without the need to prove any basic fact in advance. The 
presumption of innocence under Art 20 (3) of the constitution, presumption of 
capability under Art 192 of the civil code, presumption of sanity and
39 Elliott, note 11, at 75; Emson, note 11, at 457.
40 if such a presumption of law exists it means that one party bears the legal burden of 
proof or the burden of persuasion. So, the presumption of innocence that exists in 
modern criminal proceedings obliges the prosecution to prove, with the required 
degree of proof, the accused’s guilt. This presumption of innocence exists to favor 
and protect any criminally accused person without the need to establish any 
preliminary fact beforehand. similarly, the presumption of criminal responsibility or 
the presumption of sanity refers to the accused’s legal burden of proving of his 
irresponsibility or insanity. The prosecution is not required to prove in each case that 
the accused is responsible for the criminal act alleged to have been committed by him 
or that the particular accused is sane. The law assumes that any person is responsible 
and sane thus shouldering the burden of proving the contrary. Legal burden of proof 
(also referred to as the persuasive burden or the risk of non-persuasion or the burden 
of proof on the pleadings) is one of the various burdens that parties to litigation bear. 
unlike the burden of pleading and burden of production of evidence, legal burden of 
proof refers to the obligation that lies on one of the litigating parties to prove an issue 
of fact or law to the satisfaction of the court.
41 Elliott, note 11, at 75.
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presumption of criminal responsibility under Art 48 of the Criminal Code 
(2004), etc... are examples in this regard.
2.2. Presumptions with Basic Facts
Presumptions with basic facts, on the other hand, are presumptions that arise 
after the initial establishment of some other basic fact. Such presumptions with 
basic facts only arise when some basic fact is first established,42 No presumed 
fact will come into the scene for judicial inquiry without such prior 
establishment of a basic fact. it is impossible for anyone to bring such a 
presumption into operation without securing that prerequisite. If W/ro A, for 
example, institutes a paternity case against Ato B alleging that the defendant is 
the father of Mamush who denies the existence of marital status and his 
paternity to the child, the court must draw the conclusion that Ato B is the father 
of Mamush by virtue of Art 126 of the Revised Federal Family Code42 43 44 if W/ro A 
can prove the existence of the marriage, and secondly if she can prove that the 
child was born or conceived during the marriage. The court arrives at this 
conclusion because plaintiff has proved two basic facts that compel drawing of 
the presumed controversial fact. The two basic facts are: that there was marriage 
between plaintiff and defendant, and that Mamush was born while the marriage 
was intact. The presumed fact that the court must draw is: that Ato B is the 
father of Mamush.
The beneficiary of such presumption with basic fact has to first prove the 
existence, truthfulness or occurrence (or the contrary) of some basic fact(s). 
That is usually done by introduction of evidence - be it oral, documentary, or 
real evidence or a combination of any of these- in support of that basic fact 
alleged to exist. it is also possible to establish such basic fact by the formal 
admission of the other party, by agreement of the parties, or by judicial notice of 
such fact, if the fact alleged is part of the common knowledge or can be easily 
verified from indisputable sources.44 42 43 44
42 Id; Dwyer, Stephen I. (1975), ‘Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 21 Loy. L. Rev, at 
390. Dwyer writes that “the existence of this basic fact is a prerequisite to the 
existence of the resultant “presumed fact”. As Professor Morgan stated, the basic fact 
of a given presumption may be established by evidence, or by judicial notice, or by 
pleadings or by stipulation of parties. Read Morgan, Edmund M. (1952-1953), ‘How 
to Approach Burden of Proof and Presumptions’, 25 RockyMntn. L. Rev, at 44.
43 See Revised Family Code Proclamation No. 213/2000.
44 In cases of formal admissions and judicial notice, a litigating party may, partially or 
wholly, be exonerated from the burden of proving a particular fact under 
investigation by the court.
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In the case of presumptions with basic facts, once certain basic facts are 
established or proved, other facts may or must be taken as proved in the absence 
of contrary evidence45 46 47 48 49 or must be taken as proved conclusively. 46According to 
Emson, presumptions that require initial proof of basic facts are of three types:47 
(i) presumptions of fact, (ii) irrebuttable presumptions of law, and (iii) 
rebuttable presumptions of law. For Dennis such presumptions can be sub­
classified into: (i) provisional presumptions or presumptions of fact, (ii) 
evidential presumptions, (iii) persuasive presumptions, and (iv) conclusive 
presumptions.
There is no basic difference in these further classifications. They all are 
varieties of presumptions with basic facts; they all fall within that broad 
categorization of presumptions into presumptions of fact and presumptions of 
law. it is the latter that is further sub-classified into rebuttable and irrebuttable, 
or into evidential, persuasive and conclusive presumptions. The evidential and 
persuasive presumptions are subdivisions of rebuttable presumptions of law. 
And conclusive presumption is another expression for irrebuttable presumption.
3. Types, Operation and Effect: Presumptions of Fact and 
Law
3.1. Presumptions of Fact
Presumptions of fact also termed as provisional presumptions denote a 
conclusion which may be drawn from proof of the basic fact of the presumption, 
but the court is under no obligation to draw the conclusion, even in the absence 
of any rebutting evidence.48 For example if a person refuses to submit 
himself/herself to medical examination (that does not involve any danger) which 
a court needs to prove or disprove an allegation invoked in a statement of claim, 
the court can, by virtue of Art 22 of the Ethiopian civil code, consider the fact 
under inquiry as established.
courts may draw inference about certain facts from other proven facts or 
circumstantial evidence. Emson notes that “to say a presumption of fact has 
arisen is simply to state that as a matter of common sense it would be 
permissible to draw an inference from a proved or admitted basic fact” 49 45 46 47 48 49
45 Elliott, note 11, at 75.
46 Emson, note 11, at 457.
47 Id. it is common to classify such presumptions into presumptions of fact and 
presumptions of law. The latter consists of irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions 
of law.
48 Dennis, note 30, at 420.
49 Emson, note 11, at 458.
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Drawing of such common sense inference from other proven facts is within the 
discretion of courts. They are thus referred to as permissive presumptions or 
permissive inferences. Most legal writers label this process of drawing of a 
conclusion as inference rather than as presumption.
Though judges of courts are under no obligation to draw conclusions or 
inferences in the presumptions of fact, it is likely that they will draw relevant 
conclusions in real cases accepting presumed facts as true if the opposing other 
parties do not challenge their existence. Such presumptions impose ‘provisional’ 
or ‘tactical’ burden on the party against whom they are operating.50 Tactical 
burden is a burden that requires the party against whom the inference is 
operating to respond by adducing some evidence that could rebut the presumed 
fact. The operation of such a presumption of fact in a given case simply casts 
upon the opposing party a tactical burden to adduce evidence to the contrary.51 
in the example of the medical examination mentioned above, the person against 
whom the claim is brought may refute the inference by submitting 
himself/herself to the medical examination ordered by the court.
Strictly speaking, a tactical burden does not as such entail burden of proof, be 
it legal or evidential, on the opposing party. Yet, it is to the advantage of such 
party to adduce evidence in rebuttal rather than simply hope that the court will 
not find in favor of the party that benefits from the presumption52 because there 
is a possibility for the court to rely on the inference and decide on the issue if 
this opposing party fails to adduce evidence that contradicts it. Emson 
maintains that “[p]resumptions of fact say nothing about the incidence of the 
legal burden of proof, nor do they give rise to an evidential burden,” and further 
notes that “[o]nce a basic fact has been proved or admitted, the tribunal of fact 
may (but need not) infer another fact, the presumed fact, in the absence of any 
or any sufficient evidence to the contrary.53
3.2. Presumptions of Law: Irrebuttable and Rebuttable
A presumption of law is what the law requires a court to make where certain 
facts are established. Such presumptions may be irrebuttable or rebuttable.
51Dennis, note 30, at 420.
1 Emson, note 11, at 458. A tactical or provisional burden to adduce evidence is 
different from burden of persuasion and burden of production of evidence. it simply 
requires the party against whom a factual inference is taken by the court to adduce 
some evidence that contradicts the conclusion drawn by the court.
53Id53Id
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3.2.1. Irrebuttable presumptions of law
Irrebuttable presumptions of law /praesumptio juris et de jure/ refer to 
conclusions that must be drawn by a court on proof of a basic fact.54 Here, once 
a basic fact is established, the court must draw a conclusion about the existence 
or non-existence, truthfulness or falsity of the presumed fact. And it is not open 
for any other party or for the court to rebut the presumed fact; i.e., no rebutting 
evidence is allowed to the contrary.55 56 57 Since no rebutting evidence is admissible 
at any rate, irrebuttable presumptions of law are referred to as conclusive or 
absolute presumptions. in a paternity case for example, if Ato D admits 
marriage but argues that the child was conceived after divorce without refuting 
W/ro C’s evidence that the child was born on the 210th day from the date of 
divorce, the court is bound to draw a conclusion that Mimi is conceived in 
wedlock. This is because Art 128(1) of the Federal Revised Family Code 
provides that a child shall be deemed to have been conceived in wedlock if she 
is born within 300 days after the dissolution of marriage. in this case it is not 
possible to adduce any evidence with a view to disprove the date of conception. 
Sub (2) of the article proclaims: “No proof to the contrary shall be admitted.”
As many scholars in this area observed, irrebuttable presumptions fall outside 
the scope of the law of evidence. such presumptions are, properly speaking, 
parts of the substantive law. As Dwyer stated, “conclusive presumptions allow 
no proof which might contradict them. They thus provide an absolute basis for
judgments in certain fact situations. such presumptions are therefore more
accurately matters of substantive law than of procedural or evidentiary law
because of their definitely decisional nature.”56 57 (Emphasis added).
3.2.2. Rebuttable presumptions of law
The other types of presumptions which are taken as true presumptions are the 
rebuttable presumptions of law.51 In rebuttable presumptions of law, once a 
basic fact is proved, the court must draw a conclusion about the existence,
truthfulness or otherwise of the presumed fact. This drawing of a conclusion 
about the existence of the presumed fact is, however, susceptible to rebuttal 
evidence by the party against whom that presumption operates. in different 
jurisdictions, the legislature determines whether such party against whom a 
rebuttable presumption operates can rebut freely with any type of evidence or 
with some limited type of evidence. if one can rebut what is presumed to exist
54 Dennis, note 30, at 421.
55 Emson, note 11, at 457, 460-461; Elliott, note 11, at 75-76.
56 Dwyer, note 42, at 390; See also Elliot, note 11, at 76. Thus, scholars express that the 
expression “irrebuttable/ conclusive presumption” is a misnomer.
57 Andrews and Hirst, note 9, at 104.
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with any type of evidence that type of (rebuttable) presumption is referred to as 
freely rebuttable presumption; if one is restricted with some identified type of 
evidence, the type of (rebuttable) presumption is referred to as presumption of 
law that can be rebutted with limited evidence or restrictively rebuttable 
presumption.58 What Arts 97, 106 and 169 of the Revised Family Code provide 
in respect of disproving of marriage, irregular union and sexual intercourse, 
respectively, can be cited as examples of the first type of rebuttable 
presumptions of law. The same is true under Arts 1147, 1200, 1201, and 2132 of 
the Civil Code. Again, Art 2025 & 2026 of the Civil Code on presumptions of 
payment are, as we are going to see, good examples of the second type of 
rebuttable presumptions of law.
a) Persuasive rebuttable presumptions of law
Rebuttable presumptions of law are either persuasive presumptions or evidential 
presumptions. Persuasive presumptions of law denote a conclusion that must be 
drawn by a court on proof of the basic fact of the presumption unless and until 
the party disputing it disproves the conclusion.59 Here, if a proponent of a basic 
fact establishes this basic fact with admissible evidence or if the basic fact is 
admitted by the opponent or if the court can take judicial notice of the alleged 
basic fact, the court must draw the conclusion on the existence or otherwise, 
truthfulness or falsity of the presumed fact. And then, it is up to the party against 
whom that presumption is drawn to satisfactorily disprove that established basic 
fact with admissible evidence and to prevent the court from considering the 
presumed fact as established.
it is not sufficient for the party against whom this presumption is operating to 
introduce rebuttal evidence. To win on that issue, this party has to convincingly 
disprove the alleged basic fact with sufficient degree or quantum of proof. It is 
not sufficient to create balance of probability, or to put the fact at an equilibrium 
state of condition in a civil proceeding. This party has to prove with a 
preponderant degree of persuasion showing that his version is true. if it is a 
criminal proceeding relating to the elements of the crime under inquiry it is, of 
course, sufficient if the defendant brings or spreads some reasonable doubt 
against the prosecution’s established basic fact.
Unlike the civil proceedings, it is always the public prosecutor that bears the 
legal burden of proof on the elements of crime. in civil cases, however, an 
operation of a rebuttable presumption of law may bring about change of 
incidence of legal burden of proof. The party against whom such a presumption 58 59 58 59
58 See Brigadier General Tatek Tadesse (1997 E.C), Basic Principles of the Law of 
Evidence, (in Amharic), (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Book Center), at 76.
59 Dennis, note 30, at 421. Read also Elliot, note 11, at 78; Emson, note 11, at 461- 462.
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is invoked bears the legal burden of proof; or else, it cannot persuade the court. 
Thus Emson says: “If a presumption is persuasive, the opposing party in civil 
proceedings bears a legal burden of disproof on the balance of probabilities.”60 
Persuasive rebuttable presumptions of law thus operate to place a legal, as 
opposed to evidential, burden on the party challenging the existence or 
otherwise, truthfulness or falsity of the presumed fact.61 *
b) Evidential rebuttable presumptions of law
Evidential rebuttable presumptions of law, on the other hand, signify a 
conclusion that must be drawn by a court upon proof of the basic fact of the 
presumption in the absence of any evidence to the contrary62 As in persuasive 
rebuttable presumptions of law, evidential rebuttable presumptions of law first 
come into the picture in any lawsuit after the initial establishment of basic facts 
in the litigation process. it is such establishment of the basic fact(s) that activate 
or bring into operation this type of presumption.63
Once such a presumption has come into the scene following the proof of the 
basic fact(s), it has its own legal consequence different from that of persuasive 
presumptions of law. That effect is to put the incidence of the evidential burden, 
i.e., burden of going forward with evidence, or simply, burden of adduction of 
evidence, on the party against whom that presumption applies.64 This simply
pertains to the party that has to move to adduce or present admissible evidence 
under the pain of losing on that particular issue(s) if the case stops at that point. 
Of course, mere adduction of some evidence by the party against whom this
presumption is operable is not sufficient: rather, it is necessary to adduce 
sufficient evidence that contradicts the existence of that presumed fact. Yet, this 
party, unlike the party that bears legal burden, is not expected to convince
judges about the truthfulness of the fact under investigation on his side as
compared to his opponent because bringing the minds of judges to the state of 
equilibrium is sufficient to win on the issue under inquiry. In short, evidential 
presumptions do not affect the incidence of legal burden of proof.65
^^Emson, note 11, at 462.
^‘Dennis, note 30, at421.
63id, at 420.
JRead Morgan, Observations, note 27, to know more about the point of time in which 
a given presumption, including those of persuasive and evidential presumptions, 
comes into operation in the course of civil proceedings. Read also Morgan, 
Presumptions, note 14, to know more about effects of operations of presumptions and 
related issues.
64Read Elliot, note 11, at 78; Emson, note 11, at 461; Dennis, note 30, at 421.
65Id.
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Whether a given rebuttable presumption of law is of a persuasive or 
evidential nature has to be checked from the express or implicit gist of the law. 
One has to check by asking the following two questions. (1) which of the two 
opposing parties in the litigation risk losing on an issue of fact under inquiry, in 
the face of an operable rebuttable presumption of law, if the case stops at a 
given point? (2) which of the two opposing parties in the litigation risks losing 
on an issue of fact under inquiry, in the face of an operable rebuttable 
presumption of law, if the cogency of evidence produced on both sides remain at 
equilibrium?
4. Relationship between Burdens of Pleading, Burdens of 
Proof and Rebuttable Presumptions of Law
There is some ambiguity with respect to the operations of rebuttable 
presumptions and this traces its roots to conceptions regarding the nexus 
between burdens of pleading, burdens of proof and types of presumptions. This 
is indeed manifest in the decision of the Cassation Division in Agency for the 
Administration of Rented Houses v Mr. Bironi Atikpo mentioned earlier in the 
introduction.
in an adversarial procedural system such as ours, parties to disputes in civil 
cases start with preparations and presentations of their respective pleadings to 
courts. That is made at the pleading and pre-trial stage. The plaintiff has to state 
all material facts and grounds of claim that constitute his/her cause of action, 
i.e., s/he must allege facts to support his/her claim. An adversary system of 
justice imposes such an obligation or burden of pleading upon plaintiff.66 The 
defendant also bears another burden of pleading, preferably called burden of 
response, to what is alleged by plaintiff. Sedler notes that defendant must 
respond to each allegation of fact contained in a statement of claim, admitting or 
denying it.67
when the written pleadings are over, courts normally proceed to examine 
parties orally and determine if there are issues that should be further taken to the 
next phase to be resolved in a full scale trial. At the trial stage, litigating parties 
introduce their respective evidence as provided in the Civil Procedure Code. In 
the normal course of things, each of the parties to such dispute bear some 
burdens of proof (- evidential or legal or both). As can be gathered from Arts
66 Read Belton, note 25, at 1212-1217. To the Ethiopian context, refer to Arts 80- 91 
cum Arts 222- 227 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Empire of Ethiopia (1965).
67 Sedler, Robert Allen, (1968), Ethiopian Civil Procedure, at 2-6, 120, 199-203 ff. and 
Fisher, Stanley Z. (1969), Ethiopian Criminal Procedure: A Sourcebook, at 135. Also 
read Arts 234 - 240 cum Arts 80- 91 of the Civil Procedure Code.
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258- 260 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff must adduce evidence to 
support his allegations and defendant must adduce his own countering evidence 
under pain of loss of one’s case on an issue of fact or certain issues of facts. 
Apart from what Art 258 provides, the determination of the party entitled or 
obliged to begin to introduce evidence is to be identified from the pleadings of 
parties, and /or from the substantive law.
in case, however, the legislature has provided presumptions of law in favor 
of one or the other party in respect of some facts (which is usually based on 
some public policy grounds), it suffices if that party establishes only the basic 
fact(s) alleged in the pleading. Once such party establishes the basic fact(s), the 
court has the duty to draw the presumed fact stated in the pleading. Hence, one 
clearly observes the nexus that exists in some instances between burdens of 
pleading, burdens of proof and rebuttable presumptions of law.
Once a rebuttable presumption of law comes to be operative in the course of 
litigation as described above, it is necessary to know how it affects the 
respective legal and evidential burdens of proof of parties.
in the case of evidential presumptions of law, once a basic fact is established, 
the court is duty bound to draw a conclusion about the existence (or absence), 
the truthfulness (or falsity) of a disputed matter of fact in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary. This “shifts”68 the burden of adduction of evidence 
from the party who bears the burden to the opposite party against whom that 
presumption is operating. As the court is legally required to give a decision on 
the basis of the presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary, this 
party, therefore, bears the burden of adduction of sufficient evidence- evidence 
that is sufficient to raise doubt against the conclusion that should be drawn in its 
absence. This party’s rebuttal evidence must be strong enough to justify a 
finding in his favor if the case stops at that point. if his evidence brings equal 
probability, or puts the matter in equilibrium at the end of the litigation process, 
or if the court is left in doubt at the conclusion of all the evidence, the party with 
the evidential burden wins on that issue. That is because the party in favor of 
whom the presumption is operating, i.e., the beneficiary of the presumption, still 
bears the burden of persuasion. if the party fails to adduce preponderant
68 Strictly speaking there is no shift of burden, be evidential or persuasive. An evidential 
or legal burden can rest on only one party in respect of an identified issue. The term 
shift, a commonly employed term, must be referring to the other party’s burden to 
adduce evidence, and to persuade with that evidence to establish another fact that 
contradicts or disproves what had been made out by the party that carried the 
evidential or legal burden.
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evidence, he/she loses on that specific issue. In this regard Emson writes the 
following:69
An evidential presumption does not affect the incidence of the legal burden of 
proof but places an evidential burden upon the opposing party once certain 
basic facts have been proved or admitted. The party relying on the presumption 
still bears the legal burden of proving the presumed fact but this burden will be 
deemed to have been discharged, and the tribunal of fact will be obliged to 
accept its truth, if the opposing party has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to 
suggest the contrary. If the evidential burden has been discharged, the tribunal 
of fact will have to weigh in the balance the probative value of the evidence 
adduced by the opposing party against that of the basic facts and any other 
evidence adduced by the party bearing the legal burden, in order to determine 
whether the legal burden has been discharged.
In the case of persuasive presumptions of law, however, the court is duty bound 
to draw a conclusion about the existence or otherwise of the fact in dispute 
unless such conclusion is disproved by the other party disputing it. Such 
presumptions operate to place a legal burden on the party challenging the 
presumed fact. Here, unlike evidential presumptions, the legal burden of proof 
“shifts” from the beneficiary of the presumption to the party against whom that 
presumption is operable. Hence it is not sufficient for this latter party to adduce 
some evidence. It is necessary for this party to adduce evidence that convinces 
judges of the truth on his side with greater probability. Putting the matter at 
equilibrium will not be sufficient for this party. Emson states:70
A persuasive presumption is effectively a rule, which places the legal burden of 
proof on a particular party once certain basic facts have been proved or 
admitted. The basic facts give rise to the presumed fact, and it is for the 
opposing party to prove the contrary. The presumed fact has no evidential value 
of its own but merely lays down the rule as to the incidence of the legal burden 
of proof. [....] If no or no sufficient evidence is adduced by the opposing party 
to discharge the burden of proof (that is, to rebut the presumption) the tribunal 
of fact must accept the truth of the presumed fact.
5. Presumptions of Payment and the Cassation Court’s 
Binding Interpretation of Art 2024
Arts 2020 - 2024 of the Civil Code deal with presumptions of payment of 
contractual debts. The Code provides presumptions that arise from different 
types of conduct of creditors and from lapse of time.71 We have thus
6960Emson, note 11, at 461-462.
71k
Incidentally, one may see the public policy preference that the Ethiopian legislature 
adopted in creating these presumptions of payment of debts instead of stipulating
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presumptions of payment that arise from handing over of document of title by 
creditor to a debtor (Art 2020) * 72, from entries made by creditor (Art 2021)73, 
from a receipt given by a creditor in respect of prior or concomitant debt (Art 
2022),74 and, from the lapse of six months since those specific debts fell due 
(Art 2023)75 and from the lapse of two years since those other specified debts 
fell due (Art 2024).
isolated periods of limitation or prescriptions as was the case in the French code 
Civil. See Planiol, Marcel (1939), Treatise on Civil Law, Vol. 2, Part 1 (11th ed.; 
Translated by the Louisiana State Law Institute), Chapter IX- Prescription, at 342­
357, most of the matters provided under Arts 2023 & 2024 of the Ethiopian Civil 
Code have had different periods of prescription in France. Creation of different 
prescription periods of thirty years, twenty years, ten years, five years, three years, 
two years, one year, six months, three months, and one month for various contractual 
civil actions in the French system was criticized as being unwise and inconvenient. 
Perhaps, the drafter of the Ethiopian Civil Code, Rene David, decided not to import 
that inconvenient approach into the Ethiopian system and thus preferred to prepare a 
draft with one general prescription period of ten years (which we find under Art 1845 
of the Civil Code) and left other contractual relationships that require timely 
enforcement to be sanctioned by such presumptions of payment. This author feels 
that it would be helpful if scholars do some inquiry on the historical background of 
these provisions of the Ethiopian Civil Code. it should be clear that presumptions of 
law and period of limitation (prescription) are entirely different concepts and rules of 
law. The Cassation Division has rightly maintained that distinction in those cases 
under discussion. Ato Mekbib Tsegaw has also examined the basic distinctions 
between the two. (See Mekibib Tsegaw (2009) Presumptions of payment: Are they 
rules of Limitation or Evidentiary Rules? And Related Issues’, Ethiopian Bar Rev., 
Vol. 3, No. 2, (in Amharic) at169-178.)
72 Art 2020 goes: “The handing over of the document of title to the debtor shall raise a 
presumption that the debt has been discharged.”
73 Art 2021 runs: “Entries made by the creditor at the end, in the margin or at the back 
of a document of title, which remained at all times in his possession, shall be 
conclusive evidence although not signed or dated by him, where they tend to 
establish the debtor’s release.”
74 Art 2022 provides that:
(1) In the case of interests or other periodical dues, the creditor who gives a receipt 
for a given period, without making any reservation, shall be deemed to have 
collected the dues for the previous periods.
(2) Where the creditor gives a receipt for the principal, the debtor shall be deemed to 
have paid the interest.
75 According to Art 2023, the following debts shall be deemed to have been paid where 
six months have elapsed since they fell due:
(a) debts in respect of wages owed to clerks, office employees, servants, daily 
workers and workmen;
(b) debts due to masters or teachers in respect of lessons given monthly;
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The focus of this section is presumptions of payments embodied in Art 2024 
of the Civil Code.76 Before an analysis of the presumptions contained in this 
provision, let us examine how our courts understand and apply those 
presumptions. Almost all issues raised in court cases that involve Article 2024 
of the Civil Code are currently being resolved in accordance with the binding 
interpretation rendered by the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme Court 
in the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses v Mr. Bironi Atikpo case. 
Only recently did the Division attempt to make some departure in Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia v Ato Liyew Chekol & Ato Million Mengistu.
Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses v Bironi Atikpo's case 
relating to operation and effect of the presumptions contained in Art 202477 
indeed deserves careful analysis. The case was first submitted to the Federal 
First Instance Court in Addis Ababa. The Plaintiff, Agency for the
Administration of Rented Houses, sued defendant Mr. Bironi Atikpo stating that 
he failed, inter alia, to pay rent- debts due in respect of a house he leased from 
plaintiff. After stating its cause of action, plaintiff requested the court to decide 
against defendant declaring that he should pay the debts that were due. As the 
defendant failed to appear to defend the suit, despite summons duly served, the 
case proceeded ex-parte. Eventually the court held that the defendant should pay 
the debt that fell due for the last two years. But, it dismissed plaintiff s claim of 
the alleged debt due for more than two years maintaining that defendant is 
presumed to have paid as per Art 2024(d) of the Civil Code.
(c) debts due to hotel keepers, inn-keepers or managers of boarding-houses in 
respect of lodging and food;
(d) debts due to merchants in respect of goods and foodstuffs supplied by them to 
private persons for consumption or common use.
N.B. The conjunction “and” from sub (a) through (d) is omitted as it appears that it is 
a result of poor drafting.
76 According to this provision, “[t]he following debts shall be deemed to have been paid
where two years have elapsed since they fell due:
(a) Debts due to physicians, surgeons, dentists, midwives, pharmacists or veterinary 
surgeons in respect of professional services or supplies;
(b) Debts due to advocates, notaries or other members of the legal profession in 
respect of professional services;
(c) Debts due to handicraftsmen in respect of work done by them;
(d) Debts due in respect of rents for houses or agricultural estates;
(e) Arrears of periodical dues;
(f) interest on loans and generally any sum payable annually or at shorter periodical 
intervals.”
77 Also, refer to Mekbib Tsegaw’s brief Note (about the operation of the presumptions
under Art 2023 & 2024), cited at footnote 71 above, at 179-180.
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Partly aggrieved, the plaintiff appealed to the Federal High Court. This 
Court, however, confirmed the decision of the lower court. The court held that 
appellant’s claim of the rent debt that fell due for more than two years is not 
acceptable as it is presumed in law to have been paid.
Ultimately, the plaintiff took the case to the Cassation Division of the Federal 
Supreme Court stating, inter alia, that the lower courts committed a 
fundamental error of law in applying the rule of presumption of payment. The 
appellant contended that the presumption contained in Art 2024 of the Civil 
Code is not applicable in ex-parte cases; and that courts should not raise period 
of limitation on their own. It argued that the lower courts also committed basic 
error of law for basing their decisions on presumption which has not been 
invoked by the defendant as the case was being adjudicated ex parte.
The Cassation Division, which consisted of a panel of five judges, examined 
the case in the absence of the respondent.78 79 The issue framed by the Cassation 
Division was “whether it is possible to apply the presumption contained in Art 
2024 of the Civil Code in the circumstance where a defendant did not deny the 
alleged money debt or in the circumstance where the case is proceeded ex- 
parte.’’
Before directly going to the main issue, the Division primarily went on to 
give analysis of the nature, operation and legal effect of presumptions of law in 
general and presumptions of payment of debts in particular. It first tried to show 
differences that exist between presumptions of law and period of limitation. in 
this regard all the judges unanimously held the following:
As the presumption contained in the Civil Code is different from that of the 
period of limitation found in Art 1845 (and in other articles) of the Civil Code, 
the contention of the petitioner that the trial court erred in invoking the 
presumption under Art 2024 without its invocation by defendant is not 
acceptable. While period of limitation bars courts from entertaining cases on 
their substantive merits, on the other hand, presumptions of law (including that, 
which is found under Art 2024 of the Civil Code) entail only shift of burden of 
proof79 Unlike cases where courts are not allowed to invoke period of 
limitation on their own, it is possible to see the merits of the case brought by 
plaintiff. The fact that defendant did not invoke the operation of the 
presumption under Art 2024 does not bar courts from applying it. Petitioner
78 since respondent did not appear to defend the case at that level after proper notice (as 
was the case in the First instance Court), the Cassation Division examined the 
petitioner’s case in the absence of the respondent.
79 The Amharic version reads: “...PAftA-A hA7.fr (BTi Wf
.Prt®' nAAy...”
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confused presumption with period of limitation. That is contrary to the spirit, 
goal and express content of the law and thus is not acceptable.
However, there was no unanimity among the justices regarding the following 
points:
• Regarding the interpretation and application of Art 2024 of the Civil Code, 
i.e., whether the presumptions apply in a situation where the defendant did 
not appear and deny the claim brought against him;
• on the relevance and applicability of Art 89 of the Civil Procedure Code of 
Ethiopia (1965) to the case, i.e., whether this article of the law has relevance 
to the case at hand, and if relevant whether it relieves defendant from burden 
ofpleading;
• whether the existence of a presumption of law in a given case requires 
special rules of procedure and evidence to follow;
• whether presumptions are evidence or not; and
• whether the failure of the defendant to appear before the court to defend the 
claim brought against him in that case can be taken as an admission of 
plaintiff s claim.
The Division was thus divided into the majority (three judges) and the 
dissenting minority (two judges). The Cassation Division proceeded to address 
the main theme of the case.80 The majority opinion held the following with 
regard to presumptions of law:
Presumptions of law have substantive and procedural aspects81. The 
presumption contained in Art 2024, found in that part of the Civil Code devoted 
to Proof in relation to Contracts, is one of the numerous presumptions that we 
have in the Ethiopian substantive laws. It is one of the provisions that deal with 
presumptions of payment of contractual debts. The article lists the types of 
contractual debts that should be presumed as paid where two years have 
elapsed since they fell due. Debts due in respect of rents for houses are among 
such debts (Art 2024 (d)).
with regard to the rebuttability or irrebuttabilty of the presumption, the majority 
opinion held the following:
80 The theme was once again restated:
‘‘Under what circumstance is the presumption provided under Art 2024 of the Civil 
Code applicable? Can it be applied in a situation where defendant didn’t appear 
before the court and deny the claim(s) brought against him?’’
81 One wonders what that really means. Is it true that an operation of a given 
presumption of law has substantive and procedural aspects?
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Though the basic effect of presumptions of law is to shift burden of proof from 
one party to the other, the legal framework in which a party against whom a 
presumption operates rebuts the presumption of law82 varies....
It is understandable from the reading of Art 2026 (1) that the presumptions 
contained in Arts 2020- 2024 are irrebuttable. By providing that ‘No proof shall 
be admitted to rebut the presumptions laid down in Arts 2020- 2024’ this sub­
article made it clear that the party against whom the presumption operates 
cannot in principle adduce any rebuttal evidence. It is only by requiring the 
opposite party to take an oath that one can rebut the presumption. A party who 
intends to carry out its burden of proof should expressly indicate this in 
accordance with Art 83 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The substantive -versus- procedural nature of Article 2024 and the issue 
whether Art 2024 could have been invoked by the lower courts in an ex parte 
adjudication were also addressed in the majority opinion:
Courts should enforce these articles contained in the Law of Contracts, as they 
are parts of the substantive law. ... They are provisions, which the courts 
should enforce as any provisions in the Law of Contracts whether any of the 
parties to the litigation invoke them or not. ... Therefore, any court, which finds 
facts covered under Art 2024 in a case before it, is duty bound to presume that 
the facts are proved.
What is found in the Civil Procedure Code relating to presumptions of law 
is the same as that which is embodied in the Civil Code. According to the Civil 
Procedure Code, any factual claim of the plaintiff that is not expressly denied 
by defendant is presumed to have been admitted. ... However, where the 
defendant is a beneficiary of legal presumptions, one is relieved of such an 
obligation as Art 89 of the Civil Procedure Code expressly provides. ...83 This 
provision shows that any party who is a beneficiary of presumptions of law has 
no obligation to expressly deny those facts that are within the presumptions. 
Any defendant is not required to deny specifically the facts falling within 
presumptions. Therefore, no court can give judgment against defendant taking 
that his failure to deny such fact specifically amounts to admission.
As this is the legal framework regarding presumptions of law, courts should 
give decisions based on such understanding. Further, it is inevitable that courts 
should have to follow special rules of procedure and evidence different from
82 The Amharic goes: “...fihA PhAnT &T} PuA 7AA} PATAnTPuA
83 The English version of Art 89 of the Civil Procedure Code (which is not different 
from the Amharic version) provides the following:
“Art 89. -Legal Presumptions
Neither party needs in any pleading allege any matter of fact which the law 
presumes in his favor or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other party, 
unless the same has first been specifically denied.”
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the normal proceedings when they find a defendant who is the beneficiary of 
presumptions of law: That also holds true to the decision-making process.84
Therefore, as long as there are facts falling within presumptions of law, 
courts should enforce such presumptions irrespective of the content of 
defendant’s defense- whether defendant denies or not, it does not produce 
different outcome in respect of such a fact.85 That the case proceeded ex-parte 
does not bring any difference in this regard; defendant is not required to deny 
specifically and expressly such facts falling within presumptions of law; failure 
on this should not be taken as an admission.
The majority opinion thus concluded that “[i]t is clear from petitioner’s 
memorandum that it is requesting payment of house rent bills that fell due over 
two years. As this is the case, it is proper and it is in accordance with Art 2024 
of the Civil Code to presume that the alleged debt is paid even where the 
defendant did not invoke the provision or in situations where the case is 
proceeded ex-parte.”86 The Cassation Division thus confirmed the decisions of 
the lower courts.
The minority opinion held a different position regarding the five issues 
mentioned above. First, they maintained that “the presumptions of law that are 
found in Chapter 7 of the Civil Code, [...] including the presumption embodied 
in Art 2024 should be taken as a type of evidence like documents, witnesses, a 
party’s admission or oath; Art 2002 supports that.” They further held that, with 
regard to disproving of presumptions, Art 2025 reinforces the assertion that 
these presumptions of law constitute evidence. Thus, they concluded that the 
presumptions contained in Chapter 7, Section 3 of the Civil Code, including the 
one embodied under Art 2024, are presumptions of evidence and not of 
presumptions that the law takes on facts.
Secondly, they said that a defendant who failed to deny expressly a claim 
brought against him would be taken as admitting that claim as per Arts 83, 334 
(1) (d) and 335 of the Civil Procedure Code.87 They concluded that Art 2024 of 
the Civil Code is not applicable under such circumstances.
84 In Amharic it goes: “+hqfr PUT TAT nnAnT ®$T [A/ft+T] Pnh+frT AATA 
pnoAT AqA nAT nAAn? PatT WT hnh+AATA pAv actTa pAhAn a?OT
P+rtP PA£+C VA::"
85 “...P+AnqTA V7C nuT TAT Ehh+fiAV *Eh ¥C* ft+T +hqfr hAA AAhA PUT Ta*7
a*at £rnn*qT‘PA"”
86 “...hh h-AnnT PA£ hAA nh£A OTmP* hVn^T hArtT AAT nq£ PAVA hrtAA hhqfi
hh OTAt £u hAv ata +hqfi n,pvqAA nAqnT nATAnAc ut
*TC 2024 PUT TAT E7A+hArt wAmC +7a VA;:.”
87 Next, they contended that the court should give a decision against the defendant on 
the basis of his admission as per Art 242 of the Civil Procedure Code if,
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Thirdly, the minority opinion states that the presumption contained in Art 
2024 of the Civil Code applies where a defendant claims to have paid the 
alleged debt. if defendant raises such a defense, he would (by the operation of 
the presumption under Art 2024) be relieved of adducing any other evidence in 
support thereof. it would be the burden of the plaintiff to disprove this 
presumption by requesting defendant to take an oath and explain the fact.
Fourthly, the dissenting judges observed that the defendant did not appear to 
deny petitioner’s claim; so, they maintained, there was no issue to be framed - in 
such case Art 2024 could not be applicable. They stated that the court should 
give decision in favor of plaintiff by taking defendant’s failure to appear as 
amounting to admission.
Fifthly, noting that Art 89 of the Civil Procedure Code has no relevance to 
the case at hand they said that it is wrong to maintain that the defendant is 
relieved from the burden of pleading by virtue of the said article. Lastly, they 
held that the existence of presumptions of law, including that which is found 
under Art 2024 of the Civil Code, in a given civil proceeding does not require 
special rules of procedure and evidence different from other normal 
proceedings. As the defendant did not appear and deny the debt claimed by 
plaintiff, they concluded that he should be liable to pay the house rent arrears 
that fell due for the period before two years as well.
6. Other Court Cases involving the presumptions of payment 
under Art 2024: General Observations and Comments
The Cassation Division of the Federal supreme Court itself has cited the 
interpretation in Bironi Atikpo's case as precedent in subsequent civil cases.88 
For example, in Paoulos Rumicho v Chaltu Merdasa, the Cassation Division 
held that the debt that the defendant owed to her lawyer fell due for more than 
two years, and is thus presumed to have been paid under Art 2024 of the Civil 
Code.89 Furthermore, the Cassation Division pursued a similar line of 
interpretation and conclusion in Daniel Alemu v. Romanework Yemanebirhan et 
al.90 Some part of the dispute in Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses •
• he appears and admits the debt that fell due for over more than two years, or
• He fails to deny expressly the claim brought against him.
88 See for example Ato Paoulos Rumicho V W/ro Chaltu Merdasa case, Supreme Court 
File No. 15493, decided on 29 Hamle, 1997 E.C.
89 Defendant didn’t allege that she paid the debt, but argued that the case is barred as it 
is more than two years since it fell due.
90 Here also defendants didn’t allege an affirmative defense of payment.
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v Sossina Asfaw was also related to presumption of payment of debt due in 
respect of rents of a house and was thus partly entertained in similar fashion.
The Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses v. Bironi Atikpo case 
was different from the other cases mentioned above because it was adjudicated 
ex-parte. in the other cases, the defendants had at least appeared before the first 
instance courts and submitted their respective defenses. Except in Agency for the 
Administration of Rented Houses v. Sossina Asfaw case, all first instance courts 
recognized the existence of valid contracts between the disputing parties.91 92 93 But, 
none of the defendants mentioned raised an affirmative defense of payment of 
alleged contractual debts.
it has been widely acknowledged that the Ethiopian litigation system, both in 
the civil and criminal proceedings, is basically adversarial in nature.92 93 An 
adversary system has its own unique features and major premises. One of these 
is that courts start with no prior knowledge of the existence of a controversy 
between litigating parties in a case; judges do not know about any disputable 
fact before parties properly present and prove it to them.
Thus, a plaintiff to a lawsuit in Ethiopia who seeks justice in a civil case 
should take the initiative of following the prescribed steps to bring his/her 
opponent before a court. As s/he is the one who seeks to change the status quo, 
the plaintiff bears the burden of pleading93 of facts that constitute the cause of
91 In the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses V W/t Sossina Asfaw case, it is 
the Cassation Division that pronounced the existence of valid contractual relationship 
between the parties by reversing the decisions of the lower courts.
92 See for example the views of Sedler, note 67, at 2-6, 120, 199-203 ff. and Fisher, 
Stanley Z. (1969), Ethiopian Criminal Procedure: A Sourcebook, at xii.
93 Burden of pleading is one of the various burdens that parties to a lawsuit bear to 
successfully present, prove and eventually win or defend their respective facts in 
issue, relevant facts or collateral facts or generally their respective cases, as maybe 
the case. There are a series of legal burdens, other than the usual evidential and 
persuasive burdens, that parties have to undergo in the way of achieving certain legal 
results. The burden of initiating is one such burden and includes burdens of suing, 
filing, applying, etc. Burden of pleading may be included in this burden. The party 
with this burden has to prepare a legally sound claim or cause of action, or depending 
on the nature of the proceeding and stage of the process to prepare a legally sound 
defense or counter-claim. For some background information read the following: 
Sedler, note 67, at 120- 138; Belton, note 25, at 1205-1223; Cleary, Edward W. 
(1959- 1960), 'Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity,’’ 12 Stan L 
Rev. at 5-28; Wexler, Stephen and Effron, Jack (1983- 1984), 'Burden of Proof and 
Cause of Action,’ 29 McGill L.J. at 468- 480. Cleary wrote, “Since plaintiff is the 
party seeking to disturb the existing situation by inducing the court to take some
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action. The plaintiff should thus present the material propositions of fact that 
constitute the subject matter of a dispute and should annex evidence to support 
the assertions in the statement of claim.94 A defendant, on the other hand, is 
expected to respond to such an allegation brought against him/her by admitting 
or denying the truth of each allegation.95 As is the case for the plaintiff, the 
defendant must allege material propositions that constitute his/her defense.96 In 
other words, the defendant bears another burden of pleading, more appropriately 
burden of response. As Sedler notes “primary responsibility rests with the 
parties [even if] the court has some responsibility for developing the case”, and, 
in effect, each party “must present his version of the case to the court, that is, he 
must allege facts to support his claim or defense and introduce evidence that 
will prove the existence of those facts.97
In responding, a defendant may deny each claim and avoid liability- this is 
what is referred to as “avoidance” in the common law tradition. A defendant in a 
contractual case, for example, may, deny the existence of the alleged contract or 
may, inter alia, argue that the alleged contract is not valid. Or, defendant may 
admit some or all allegations of the plaintiff and plead additional facts that 
deprive the admitted facts of adverse legal effects- this is referred to as 
“confession and avoidance”. in contractual cases such defenses may include 
counter-claim, set-off, force majeure, mistake, defect of consent, payment or 
other grounds of extinction of obligation. In other cases defendant may admit all 
or part of the claim thereby accepting full or partial liability.98
measure in his favor, it seems reasonable to require him to demonstrate his right to 
relief.”(at 7.) Professor Belton also wrote:
The burden of pleading imposes upon a party the obligation to notify his opponent 
and the court, in the appropriate manner, of the elements upon which he intends to 
rely either to sustain or to defeat liability. The policy behind the pleading burden 
is to provide notice to the courts and to the other party of the nature of a claim or 
defense upon which evidence will be presented to the court. (at 1216.)
94 See Arts 80, 222-228 0f the Civil Procedure Code.
95 See Art 234 (1) particularly (d) - (f) Civil Procedure Code.
96 Art 247 (2) of the Civil Procedure Code provides:
“Material propositions are those propositions of fact or law which a plaintiff must 
allege in order to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege in order to 
constitute his defense.”
97 Sedler, note 67, at 120.
98 E.g. in a contractual claim of 60,000 birr for house rent brought by plaintiff, 
defendant may respond saying ‘yes I have agreed to pay 5,000 birr per month for the 
house I leased from plaintiff; yet I paid 50,000 birr for the last ten months and I’m 
left to pay 10,000 birr only.’
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If the defendant fails to appear with his/her statement of defense, after being 
duly served of the summons, the court should proceed ex-parte” In failing to 
appear with his statement of defense, defendant has waived his right to raise any 
ground of defense and the opportunity to rebut plaintiff’s evidence. It is at his 
risk if s/he fails to respond, to give relevant factual data to the court and to 
present rebuttal evidence. In such instances the court should examine plaintiff s 
case and evidence, and if it is satisfied that the plaintiff has a valid claim and has 
suffered some injury or damage, it should give judgment in his favor against 
defendant.99 100
As shown above, the Agency for the Administration of Rented Houses sued 
the defendant for failing to pay the debt he owed to it. It based its cause of 
action on the contract of rent of a specified house, and claimed that the 
defendant is in breach of contract by failing to perform his obligation. By virtue 
of Art 2001 (1) of the Civil Code this plaintiff bears the burden of proof in 
respect of the existence of the alleged obligation. Whether the defendant appears 
with his defense of any kind or not, the burden of adduction of evidence to show 
the existence of the alleged contract ought to have been borne by the plaintiff.99 100 101 
It appears from the case that the existence of the alleged contract, which was a 
basis for the plaintiff s right to relief and of defendant’s obligation, was not 
disputed (or plaintiff must have produced documents that prove its existence).
Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to pay monthly rental bills. As plaintiff 
pleaded and proved the existence of the obligation that defendant was bound to 
honor, it had no further obligation under the circumstances.102 By virtue of Arts 
247 (2) and 234 of the Civil Procedure Code it was the responsibility of the 
defendant to respond against this allegation. Depending on the facts on the 
ground, defendant (if willing) could have either admitted this allegation or could 
have raised grounds of defense, if any.103 It was the responsibility of the 
defendant to plead grounds of defense such as payment - an affirmative defense, 
which should be alleged to avoid liability. Whether defendant did pay the 
claimed debt or not, could not be a subject matter of judicial notice. It is also 
clear that the court could not play a defendant’s role; it could not raise such 
defenses as nullity, variation, or extinction of that proved contract or it could not
99 See Arts 233 and 70 (a) Civil Procedure Code.
100 Sedler, note 67, at 163-164.
101 In case of formal admission, plaintiff would be relieved of such burden.
102 If it were not able to show the existence of valid claim, the court should have given 
judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff at that stage.
103 See Arts 80 - 89 Cum Arts 234-237 of the Civil Procedure Code about the burden, or 
obligations of the defendant, if he wants to avoid the risk of losing on an issue of fact 
or on the whole of the case.
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speculate and raise any other defenses such as force majeure, counter-claim or 
set-off. In this writer’s opinion, the majority in the Cassation Division and the 
judges in the lower courts should not have invoked Article 2024 and raised an 
affirmative defense of payment of money on their own.
According to Art 2001(2), a person “who alleges that an obligation is void, 
has been varied or is extinguished shall prove the facts causing such nullity, 
variation or extinction.” It is thus the responsibility of the defendant to raise any 
of these allegations or defenses. At the pleading and pre-trial stage, we do not 
talk about the party that bears the burden of proof, be it evidential or legal 
burden.104 The issue of burden of proof comes into the picture at the trial stage 
of the proceeding. And it comes into the picture at that trial stage if there is at 
least one contentious issue of fact, which the court has framed in accordance 
with Art 246(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
in the case at hand, whether defendant did pay the debt claimed by plaintiff 
or not was not at issue as defendant did not appear and submit such a defense. 
Nor was it framed as such by any of the courts that entertained the case from 
first instance through appeal and then at cassation level. As the minority in the 
Cassation Division properly observed in this regard and as Art 246(2) of the 
Civil Procedure Code provides, there was no issue to be framed. Judges of lower 
courts and the majority in the Cassation Division reached at a wrong conclusion 
because they merely and wrongly focused on burden of proof of the fact of 
payment as if it was a fact in issue. The holding of the majority that plaintiff did 
not express his intention to rely on the sworn statement of defendant as per Art 
83 of the Civil Procedure Code is a result of this wrong focus on burden of proof 
on a party that did not bear the said burden.
As defendant did not raise any defense, there was no single fact in favour of 
defendant, which the court could have established. Defendant did not allege a 
fact that could be established/proved by drawing a conclusion from another 
alleged and known (that could be judicially noticed) or admitted or proved fact. 
There was no basic fact; and there was no presumed fact alleged by defendant 
that the court had to deduce from. As shown before, presumption of law 
envisages certain conditions. There are no ideal facts that exist in the vacuum. 
There had to be an asserted fact, the truthfulness or otherwise of which could be 
established by proving a related basic fact. in the case at hand, there was no fact, 
or circumstance that commands calling for and applying any presumption of law 
in favor of the defendant.
As made clear in section 4 above, there is some link between certain 
presumptions and some rules of burden of pleading. As Art 89 (titled ‘Legal
104 See Sedler, note 67, at 120-122.
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Presumptions’) provides, “[n]either party needs in any pleading allege any 
matter of fact which the law presumes in his favor or as to which the burden of 
proof lies upon the other party, unless the same has first been specifically 
denied.”
This provision does not stipulate about the exemption of a party’s burden of 
pleading as such. It rather provides for an exception to the rules of pleading 
embodied in Articles 80 to 88 of the Civil Procedure Code. This pertains to the 
exception rule whereby a party to a lawsuit may be exempted under certain 
circumstances from pleading some facts in preparing his statement of claim or 
defense. The facts that may fall within this exception are those that the law 
presumes in favor of one,105 and those other facts that the other party to a 
dispute bears burden of proof.106 In such instances, the party that bears burden 
of pleading is not required, in principle, to plead specifically alleging such facts 
which the law presumes to exist in one’s favor or which the law imposed the 
burden of proving on the opponent. Again, this exception will not be applicable 
if such fact is already specifically denied by the other party in his pleading. By 
providing the exceptional situations where parties may be exempted from 
burden of pleading of some facts, the provision clearly states the need to allege 
other facts in pleadings. There hardly exists a principle of law or rule of positive 
law or case law that entirely relieves a party to a dispute from his burden of 
pleading on the assumption that a given rebuttable presumption of law will be 
applicable in the case.
The Civil Code does not presume the fact of payment of debts as such in 
favor of any defendant. Unlike the presumption of common property among 
spouses or the presumption of equal share of joint owners, there is no 
presumption of payment in the contractual relations of parties. Payment is one 
possible affirmative defense which can be invoked only by defendants. In the 
case at hand, this affirmative defense should not have been put on the judicial 
plate for it was not specifically pleaded by defendant.105 106 107 It was not, and still is 
not, one of the facts that the law presumes in favor of a defendant in a 
contractual case; it is not a fact whose burden of proof rests on plaintiff.
105 See for e.g., presumption of common matrimonial property (Art 63(1) Revised 
Family Code) or equality of shares in joint ownership of property (Art 1259 Civil 
Code).
106 See for e.g., burden of proof of will (Arts 896 & 897 of the Civil Code).
107 If courts are allowed to raise such defenses by their own, it appears that summoning 
of defendants would be unnecessary in many cases. And if such court initiatives are 
proper, there would be no reason to prohibit courts from raising issues such as set-off 
or merger or novation, or variation of the contract.
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This author is of the opinion that the First Instance Court should have given 
judgment on the case in accordance with Art 254 of the Civil Procedure Code 
since plaintiff and defendant were not at issue as the minority maintained 
properly. The author however does not agree with what the minority maintained 
regarding the implication taken from defendant’s absence. As mentioned before, 
the two dissenting judges took defendant’s absence as amounting to admission. 
The dissenting opinion did not cite any provision/s of law to substantiate its 
position. A careful reading of Articles 82-89 in conjunction with Arts 235, 240­
243, and Art 252 of the Civil Procedure Code, show what statement or conduct 
amounts to formal admission.108 Defendant’s absence is not listed therein. There 
is no justifiable reason for us to assume admission and to relieve the plaintiff 
from its evidential and persuasive burdens in such occasions. The opinion of the 
majority in this regard is proper, sound and in accordance with the law.
What the Criminal Procedure Code (1961) provides for under Arts 160 ff in 
respect of an accused person whose case is to be tried in abstentia can indeed 
substantiate what the majority maintained. in criminal trials conducted in 
abstentia the court (in the absence of plea of guilt) assumes that the defendant 
has pleaded not guilty, and orders the prosecution to produce evidence. 
Similarly, the absence or the non-appearance of the defendant in ex parte civil 
adjudication cannot be presumed as admission of the factual allegations stated in 
the statement of claim.
The principal basis of the decisions of the lower courts and of the Cassation 
Division is Art 2024 of the Civil Code. This provision is found under Section 3, 
Chapter 7 of the Civil Code, which deals with Proof in Relation to Contracts. 
As one can gather from this title and the sub-titles in the subsequent three 
sections, Arts 2001-2026 are evidentiary rules applicable to contractual disputes 
(and other non-contractual obligations by virtue of Art 1677/1).109 Art 2024 is
108 These are: Admitting expressly the facts alleged by the other party in one’s pleading 
(a contrario reading of Art 234 (1)(e)) & Art 242; Admitting expressly the facts 
alleged by the other party during oral examination (Arts 241 & 242); Taken as 
admitting the other party’s allegations when one fails to deny specifically or by 
necessary implication in ones pleading (Arts 82-89 & 235) ; Admitting documents, 
contents of documents or other related things upon notice to admit (Art 240); 
Agreement with the other party on some or all facts of the case (Art 252); Admitting 
when testifying as a witness (Art 124 (2) or Art 261(2)).
109 It is not unlikely for evidentiary principles and rules to be incorporated in substantive 
and procedural laws of Ethiopia. That is a common occurrence until this day. It 
suffices here to remind our readers that the incorporation of such principles and rules 
for example in the Law of Property part of the Civil Code, in the Revised (Federal) 
Family Code, in the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, etc. This is the case despite the 
dominant adversarial/accusatorial feature of the country’s system of litigation.
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one of the five provisions that provide for presumptions of payment of money 
debts.
All the presumptions in these five provisions are presumptions of law 
available in favor of parties that assert payment of debts. Although these 
provisions are incorporated in the substantive Civil Code, they are applicable 
when there are points or circumstantial facts that call for their operation. It is 
wrong to maintain that these presumptions are applicable in every civil 
proceeding without first checking the existence (or absence) of circumstances 
that may allow their operation. One should rather bear in mind that pleadings of 
parties to civil cases provide the basic foundation for the operations of 
presumptions with basic facts. It is only presumptions without basic facts that do 
not depend on pleadings of parties and proof thereof. Also, one needs to 
recognize that evidential and persuasive burdens usually follow the pleadings of 
parties which in turn may impact upon the operations of presumptions in some 
circumstances.
The majority opinion in the Cassation Division has thus erred in holding that 
presumptions of law operate against plaintiffs in civil cases irrespective of 
defendants’ pleadings whether it is one of admission or denial. Rather, no
presumption of law can be applicable against the plaintiff, for example, if 
defendant admits the plaintiff s allegations. Such presumptions of law as those 
indicated in Arts 2020-2024 of the Civil Code rather presuppose assertion of 
some affirmative defense and counterclaim by defendants. No such presumption 
will be applicable without the prior allegation and subsequent establishment of 
some basic facts. For stronger reasons, such presumptions do not come into
operation if the cases proceed ex-parte.
However, the lower courts and the Cassation Division have failed to 
recognize that the existence of a basic fact is a prerequisite to the existence of 
the resultant presumed fact, both of which should be found in the pleadings of 
parties becoming contentious. This author is of the opinion that the
presumptions of payment under Arts 2020- 2024 of the Civil Code are not 
applicable in circumstances where (i) defendants admit alleged debts, (ii)
defendants fail to specifically deny alleged debts, and (iii) the cases are
entertained ex-parte.
The presumptions in the five articles of the Civil Code are not types of 
evidence but are rules of law. The minority in the Cassation Division erred in 
treating the presumptions of law as types of evidence. Of course, Art 2002 
seems to give the impression that presumptions are evidence or types of 
evidence. This provision titled “Means of Evidence”, (rather it ought to have 
been “Means of Proof’), recognizes writings, witnesses, presumptions,
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admissions of parties and oath, as means of proof, and its content provides for 
means of proof10 of factual disputes. Evidence, which consists of testimony, 
documentary evidence and real evidence, is one of the means utilized to prove 
or disprove disputed facts.110 111 As made clear in earlier sections of this Article, a 
given presumption of law, on the other hand, imposes burden of adduction of 
evidence or burden of persuasion or both on the other party provided that the 
beneficiary of the presumption proves certain other basic fact(s).
As discussed earlier, a rebuttable presumption of law comes into operation 
after establishment of a basic fact. in the case at hand, defendant did not plead 
the fact of payment. As he did not allege this fact, the judges that adjudicated 
the case had no legal ground to investigate about the truthfulness or falsity of 
this fact. Had defendant pleaded the fact of payment, the court could have 
framed this issue: Can the defendant be presumed to have paid the claimed debt 
or not? If that was the case, in principle, the defendant was the party that carried 
both burden of adducing supportive evidence and burden of proving the asserted 
fact to the required standard of proof (Art 2001(2) of the Civil Code).
But, defendant could have relieved himself of the evidential burden as the 
plaintiff gave a formal admission of one basic fact -i.e., plaintiff admitted that 
the debt had been due for more than two years. This could have forced the 
operation of a rebuttable presumption of law under Art 2024 of the Civil Code 
in favor of defendant.110 111 112 From this lapse of more than two years, the court could 
have necessarily presumed payment of the debt. if that was the case, plaintiff 
could have been under evidential burden- the burden of persuasion imposed on
110 Strictly speaking, evidence and proof are not synonymous terms. While evidence 
refers to the data or input that goes to establish the existence or non-existence, the 
truthfulness or falsity of an alleged matter of fact, proof refers to the end result, 
which we obtain in the process. Evidence is one of the means that take us to this end 
result. Others include admission of the other party, drawing of inference, ocular 
observation of judges, legal presumptions and statement of the other party given 
under oath.
111 in the earlier times means of proving could include battling or fighting with 
dangerous animals or the adversary party or his representative; or, it could be 
requiring one of the parties to undergo an ordeal process such as capturing red-hot 
iron, or drowning in a big water body; or it could be requiring a party to swear in the 
name of God or any other supernatural force, i.e., oath, and later on system of 
compurgation.
112 All the presumptions from Arts 2020-2024 are rebuttable presumptions of law. 
Because the party against whom these presumptions are operating can rebut the 
presumptions by proving either of the facts under Art 2025 or by requiring the other 
party to take oath and tell the truth. Of course, one may say that these are rebuttable 
presumptions of law that do not allow free rebuttal.
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defendant by virtue of Art 2001(2) of the Civil Code. All these were not 
required in our case, as defendant did not plead payment of the alleged debt. 
Hence there was no point to raise the issue of presumption of payment.
Furthermore, it is wrong to say that a given presumption of law has both 
substantive and procedural aspects. As shown above, irrebuttable presumptions 
of law are rules of the substantive laws; legal presumptions without basic facts 
are also rules of substantive law that allocate legal burden of proof. The rules of 
presumptions of payment from Arts 2020 - 2024 of the Civil Code are clearly 
evidentiary rules incorporated in the Code. That classification of presumptions 
of law into rebuttable and irrebuttable should not be confused with a sub­
classification of rebuttable presumptions of law into freely rebuttable ones and 
restrictively rebuttable presumptions of law.
The rules of presumptions of payment embodied in Arts 2020-2024 of the 
Civil Code are clearly presumptions of law. Whether these presumptions of law 
are irrebuttable (or rebuttable) presumptions of law can be checked from Arts 
2025 and 2026. In the case of irrebuttable presumptions of law there is no
chance or loophole for courts or adversely affected parties to rebut presumed 
facts. On the other hand, in the case of rebuttable presumptions of law it is clear 
that adversely affected parties can rebut the existence not only of basic facts but 
also of presumed facts. The scope may of course vary depending upon the
elements of specific provisions. A reading of Arts 2025 and 2026 shows that a 
party against whom a presumption of payment is taken can rebut the existence 
of the presumed fact.113 Nevertheless, the type of evidence and the means of 
rebuttal are limited by the legislature. The observation of the Cassation 
Division, which states that the rules of presumptions of payment from Arts 
2020-2024 are basically irrebuttable is thus contrary to the explicit readings of 
Arts 2025 and 2026.114
The effects of presumptions in civil proceedings entail some legal
consequences which vary greatly depending on the types of presumptions and 
on the strength of evidence that establish basic facts. Entailing “shift” of
evidential or persuasive or both burdens are cases in point in this regard. Both 
the majority and the minority have wrongly maintained that the only effect of
113 Beware, what is to be rebutted or disproved is not the rules of law existing in the 
Civil Code; only basic and presumed facts are to be an object of rebuttal.
114 It is possible to rebut the presumptions of payment by proving acknowledgment of 
debts in writing, or by proving the institution of proceedings on the subject matter 
prior to that time which serves as a basic fact to the presumption, or by proving 
through the sworn statement of defendant. The Cassation Division has recently 
modified this in Commercial Bank of Ethiopia v Ato Liyew Chekol & Ato Million 
Mengistu case.
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presumptions is the shift of burden of proof from one party to the other. The 
presumption of payment of a contractual debt under Art 2023 or Art 2024 of the 
Civil Code, for instance (assuming that it entered into operation following a 
specific assertion of payment of alleged debt that elapsed the time indicated in 
the articles of the law), do not entail shift of burden of persuasion. if the 
cogency of the evidence introduced by defendant and plaintiff in such a case 
appears to be at equilibrium, the plaintiff wins the case since defendant bears 
persuasive burden under Art 2001 (2) of the Civil Code.
The majority in the Cassation Division also held that the operation of 
presumptions of law requires the pursuance of special rules of procedure and 
evidence. This holding does not, however, indicate the ‘special rules’ that 
should be followed. As far as this author knows, there is no single rule of 
procedure or evidence in Ethiopia or in any other country that compels courts to 
follow special procedure or evidentiary norm if they are faced with cases 
involving some presumptions of law. Furthermore, there is no unique decision­
making process due to presumptions of law. The operations of presumptions 
entail various consequences: some presumptions entail shift of tactical burden; 
others impose evidential burden on the adversely affected party; there are also 
some limited presumptions that determine the persuasive burden to be borne by 
the adversely affected party, etc. No special rule of procedure or evidence is 
thus necessary under all these circumstances as the minority properly 
maintained.
Conclusions
The main focus of this article has been on cases of true presumptions of law, 
i.e., rebuttable presumptions of law. These presumptions clearly presuppose the 
establishment of basic facts before courts resort to drawing conclusions 
regarding the presumed facts. Such basic and presumed facts must be part of the 
allegations of the parties in dispute. It is the assertions of facts in the pleadings 
that provide the foundation for evidential and persuasive burdens. Mere 
allegations of facts may not force the coming into operation of such 
presumptions of law because proving of basic facts is indeed a requirement. 
Admission of such basic facts by an opponent may relieve the proponent from 
the burden of establishing the asserted basic fact. This is also true if the basic 
fact alleged is of a kind which courts may take judicial notice of. Otherwise, it is 
hardly possible to see the coming into operation of such presumptions.
The holding of the Cassation Division in Agency for the Administration of 
Rented Houses v Bironi Atikpo substantiates this point. As it stands now, the 
decision of the Cassation Court is the authoritative interpretation of Art 2024 of 
the Civil Code in respect of the operations of the presumptions. The binding 
precedent seems to give a function to courts to assume the role of the defendant
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in raising affirmative defense of payment. This is a phenomenon that goes 
against common sense and the essence of our ‘predominantly adversarial’ 
system.
This line of interpretation is not only erroneous but it can also have adverse 
effects on economic, social and contractual transactions. A case in point can be 
difficulties that can be encountered by parties who seek judicial remedies from 
contracting parties in default. In other words, plaintiffs may be hindered from 
instituting lawsuits against defaulting contracting parties, because such suits can 
be considered as lacking cause of actions. The interpretation pursued by the 
Cassation Division gives definitive effects to rebuttable presumptions of law 
which is even stronger than the provisions on periods of limitation which at least 
should be raised by the defendant. This seems to be contrary to the intention of 
the legislature and perhaps to the wise formulation of Rene David in devising 
such open affirmative defenses which debtors can invoke against ‘lazy’ 
creditors.
Thus, this author submits that the Cassation Division of the Federal Supreme 
Court reconsider its binding interpretation of Art 2024 of the Civil Code in the 
light of the unique features of rebuttable presumptions of law and the 
justifications behind such presumptions in our substantive law. The author also 
hopes that the legislature will recognize the injustice that this interpretation can 
entail against honest creditors, and duly address the potential ‘ambiguities’ that 
are susceptible to erroneous interpretation. __________■
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